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INTRODUCTION 
During a floor debate in 1976, Representative Henry Hyde explained, 
“I would certainly like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an 
abortion, a rich woman, a middle class woman, or a poor woman. 
Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the [Medicaid] bill.”1 For a 
short time after the Supreme Court of the United States established the 
right to abortion in Roe v. Wade,2 Medicaid did not distinguish between 
coverage for abortion and other medical services.3 That all changed when 
Congress passed the Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Act in 1976.4  
Under the Medicaid Act,5 a state may choose to receive federal 
funding to administer a Medicaid program.6 Although a state’s 
participation in the program is completely voluntary, the state’s program 
must comport with various federal requirements and meet with the 
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 1. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, WHOSE CHOICE? HOW THE HYDE AMENDMENT HARMS POOR 
WOMEN 14 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL)), 
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Hyde_Report_FINAL_
nospreads.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW8A-JPW6]. 
 2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973). Specifically, the Court held that state criminal 
abortion laws that only provide exceptions for abortion procedures necessary to save the life of the 
mother are unconstitutional because they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which “protects against state action the right to privacy.” See id. 
 3. Marissa Spalding, How Hyde Hurts Women, CONSCIENCE (Dec. 3, 2015), http:// 
consciencemag.org/2015/12/03/how-hyde-hurts-women/ [https://perma.cc/L4W4-FG42]. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a (2012)). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012). 
 6. Sandra Berenknopf, Comment, Judicial and Congressional Back-Door Methods That Limit 
the Effect of Roe v. Wade: There is No Choice if There is No Access, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 653, 655–56 
(1997). 
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approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.7 Congress passed 
the Hyde Amendment to limit Medicaid funding of abortions to only those 
Congress deemed medically necessary—where the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.8 In 1994, Congress 
expanded the Hyde Amendment’s reach by also allocating funding for 
abortions when the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.9 
For low-income women who rely on Medicaid—and for those who 
lack the funds to pay an extra premium for an insurance plan that covers 
abortion—the abortion right is no right at all if their state’s Medicaid 
program does not fund abortion to the same degree it funds other general 
health services. Unless these women have savings or another source of 
money available, their inability to pay for an abortion precludes them from 
accessing one. Thus, Hyde renders the abortion right meaningless for 
women who cannot otherwise gather the funds required to exercise the 
right. 
This Note will argue that a right to abortion coverage for women who 
lack the means to access the right can be accomplished not only through 
the recognition of an intersectional suspect classification but also an 
interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA)10 as conferring positive rights. In Harris v. McRae, the Court 
established the Hyde Amendment’s constitutional validity.11 In doing so, 
the Court maintained that because Congress did not impinge on a 
substantive right or purposefully detriment a suspect class through Hyde, 
the rational relation standard applied.12 Recognizing a suspect 
classification that accounts for the intersection of race, sex, and 
socioeconomic status would be the first step towards triggering a strict 
scrutiny analysis of Hyde due to the disproportionate impact Hyde has on 
disadvantaged women of color. Additionally, understanding the PPACA 
as conferring a positive right to health care could eventually favor a 
finding of a positive right to abortion coverage, thus changing the Court’s 
due process analysis in Harris. 
The first section of this Note will introduce the Hyde Amendment, 
the PPACA, and the role the PPACA has played in worsening Hyde’s 
impact on low-income women.13 The second section will introduce the 
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equal protection and due process problems presented in Harris and Maher 
v. Roe,14  explain the importance of recognizing an intersectional suspect 
classification in equal protection analysis, and explain how the PPACA 
can be read as conferring a positive health care right.15 The third section 
will explain how recognizing a positive health care right (and positive 
constitutional rights, generally), though a drastic change from the Court’s 
current reading of the Constitution and unlikely to take place at this time, 
could change the due process analysis for Hyde and actually guarantee a 
woman’s right to an abortion.16 The fourth section will address the fate of 
Hyde, the PPACA, and abortion rights under the Trump administration.17 
This Note will conclude by encouraging further research into two avenues 
to find a better-protected abortion right—recognizing an intersectional 
suspect classification and, pending the Trump administration’s further 
treatment of the PPACA, reading the PPACA as conferring a positive 
health care right. 
I. THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) 
The impact of the Hyde Amendment falls particularly hard on 
women of color, who are disproportionately likely to be insured by the 
Medicaid program; thirty percent of black women and twenty-four percent 
of Hispanic women aged fifteen to forty-four are enrolled in Medicaid, 
compared with fourteen percent of white women.18 To afford an abortion, 
many low-income women lacking coverage forgo paying utility bills, rent, 
or buying food for themselves and their children.19 Others rely on family 
members for financial help, receive financial assistance from clinics, or 
sell their personal belongings.20 In addition, in a 2009 literature review, 
the Guttmacher Institute found that one-fourth of women who would have 
Medicaid-funded abortions instead give birth when this funding is 
unavailable.21 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in 
                                                     
 14. See generally Harris, 448 U.S. at 297; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. Heather D. Boonstra, Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling Financially: Why Insurance 
Coverage Matters, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 46, 49 (2016), https://www. 
guttmacher.org/about/gpr/2016/07/abortion-lives-women-struggling-financially-why-insurance-
coverage-matters [https://perma.cc/4DAG-DV6C]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See STANLEY K. HENSHAW ET. AL, GUTTMACHER INST., RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID 
FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/ 
default/files/report_pdf/medicaidlitreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V2Z-RSKS]. 
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Harris, “[t]he Court’s opinion studiously avoids recognizing the 
undeniable fact that for women eligible for Medicaid—poor women—
denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion is equivalent to denial of legal 
abortion altogether.”22 
The PPACA not only follows Hyde’s restrictions but also worsens 
Hyde’s impact on low-income women and women of color. Both the 
PPACA and an Executive Order issued by President Obama apply Hyde’s 
funding restrictions to insurance policies offered on state insurance 
exchanges.23 States or insurers offering plans in a state marketplace are not 
required to offer abortion coverage, and the PPACA explicitly prohibits 
states from including abortion in any essential benefits package.24 As a 
result, women who receive subsidies from the federal government to help 
them purchase private health insurance through state-based exchanges 
have to pay two premiums for their insurance—one to pay for the cost of 
the plan related to covering abortion, regardless of whether it is ever 
utilized, and one to cover all the other costs of their health plan.25 
The PPACA also stipulates that at least one multi-state plan must 
limit abortion coverage to the coverage permitted by current federal law—
pregnancies that endanger the life of the woman or are the result of rape 
or incest.26 While state Medicaid programs continue to have the option to 
cover abortion in other circumstances using only state funds, states can 
pass laws that bar all plans participating in the state marketplace from 
covering abortions; at least twenty-five states have done so since the 
PPACA was signed into law.27 
At a minimum, states must cover those abortions that meet the 
federal exceptions in the Hyde Amendment;28 they have the right to fund 
more than federal law permits, but they may not fund less.29 Most state 
                                                     
 22. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 338 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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29, 2010).  
 24. Alina Salganicoff et. al., Coverage for Abortion Services and the ACA, HENRY J. KAISER 
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 27. Id. 
 28. State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-funding-abortion-under-medicaid [https:// 
perma.cc/4RZK-GLT9]. 
 29. Access Denied: Origins of the Hyde Amendment and Other Restrictions on Public Funding 
for Abortion, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/access-denied-origins-hyde-
amendment-and-other-restrictions-public-funding-abortion [https://perma.cc/EMF6-SJB7]. 
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legislatures have imposed restrictions on public funding for abortion and, 
at present, only fifteen states fund abortions for low-income women on the 
same or similar terms as other pregnancy-related and general health 
services.30 Of these states, ten provide the funding under court orders.31 Of 
women aged fifteen to forty-four enrolled in Medicaid, sixty percent live 
in the thirty-five states and the District of Columbia that do not cover 
abortion except in limited circumstances; this amounts to about seven 
million women of reproductive age, including 3.4 million who are living 
below the federal poverty level (FPL).32 
Even though the number of women gaining access to health 
insurance is rising under the PPACA, an increasing share of women are 
facing limitations in the scope of that coverage when it comes to abortion 
services.33 Coverage restrictions disproportionately affect poor and low-
income women with limited ability to pay for abortion services with out-
of-pocket funds.34 Women of color are disproportionately likely to be 
insured by Medicaid,35 and over half of all women on Medicaid have 
abortion coverage limited to pregnancies that endanger their lives or are a 
result of rape or incest.36 As Professor Cynthia Soohoo notes, the Supreme 
Court’s abortion funding cases allowed the federal government to use 
Medicaid “to create, as a practical matter, a different set of rights for the 
rich and the poor.”37 Rather than expanding coverage for medically 
necessary abortions, “health care reform is likely to result in the largest 
expansion of the Hyde restrictions since the amendment went into effect 
in 1977.”38  
                                                     
 30. Spalding, supra note 3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Boonstra, supra note 18. 
 33. Alina Salganicoff et. al., Coverage for Abortion Services in Medicaid, Marketplace Plans 
and Private Plans, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Abortion in Medicaid], 
http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-in-medicaid-
marketplace-plans-and-private-plans/ [https://perma.cc/Q67M-ZCWU]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Boonstra, supra note 18. 
 36. Abortion in Medicaid, supra note 33. 
 37. Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions Under 
Health Care Reform, 15 CUNY L. REV. 391, 441 (2012). 
 38. Id. 
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II.  FINDING A RIGHT TO ABORTION COVERAGE UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES 
A. Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae 
In two decisions within three years, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of (1) states limiting the use of their own Medicaid 
benefits to medically necessary abortions,39 and (2) the Hyde 
Amendment.40 The result is a negative abortion right with little utility for 
women without health insurance or other resources to access that right. 
In Maher, the Court determined indigent women seeking abortions 
did not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes 
previously recognized by its cases.41 Two indigent women had attacked 
the validity of a Connecticut regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits 
for first trimester abortions to those that were “medically necessary.”42 
While the district court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbid the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions 
from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical 
expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth,43 the Court held that the 
district court erred in its decision.44 The Court explained it had never held 
that financial need alone identifies a suspect classification for purposes of 
equal protection analysis.45 
Additionally, the Court found that unlike the law in Roe, the 
regulation did not interfere with a woman’s fundamental right to privacy 
in making the decision to have an abortion because it placed no obstacles 
in a pregnant woman’s path to accessing one.46 The Court wrote that “[t]he 
indigency that may make it difficult and in some cases, perhaps, 
impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any 
way affected by the Connecticut regulation.”47 The Court also found that 
“a State is not required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice 
to favor normal childbirth any more than a State must so justify its election 
to fund public but not private education.”48 As a result, the Court 
determined the Connecticut regulation at issue was rationally related to a 
                                                     
 39. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464–65 (1977). 
 40. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298–99 (1980). 
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 42. Id. at 466–67. 
 43. Id. at 468. 
 44. Id. at 470. 
 45. Id. at 471. 
 46. Id. at 472–74. 
 47. Id. at 475. 
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constitutionally permissible purpose—a state’s strong and legitimate 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth—and was therefore 
constitutionally valid.49 
Moreover, the Court in Harris declared it “does not follow that a 
woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to 
the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected 
choices.”50 The Court directly addressed the question of whether the Hyde 
Amendment, by denying public funding for certain medically necessary 
abortions, contravenes the liberty or equal protection guarantees of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.51 The plaintiffs included four 
Medicaid recipients who wished to have medically necessary abortions but 
did not qualify for federal funds under the versions of Hyde in 1977 and 
1978.52 The district court found that when an abortion is medically 
necessary to safeguard the pregnant woman’s health, the disentitlement to 
Medicaid assistance impinges directly on the woman’s right to decide, in 
consultation with her physician, whether to terminate her pregnancy.53 
Thus, the district court held that Hyde violated the Fifth Amendment’s 
equal protection guarantee because Congress’s decision to fund medically 
necessary services generally, but only certain medically necessary 
abortions, served no legitimate governmental interest.54 However, the 
Court did not agree. It explained that although the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government 
interference with freedom of choice in personal decisions, it does not 
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the 
advantages of that freedom.55 
After determining Hyde violated no constitutionally protected 
substantive rights, the Court followed its determination in Maher that 
poverty is not a suspect class and that the limitation of federal Medicaid 
funds to certain medically necessary abortions is rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.56 The Court 
declared that Hyde, like the regulation in Maher, places no governmental 
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.57 
Rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical 
                                                     
 49. See id. at 478 (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977)). 
 50. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).  
 51. Id. at 301. 
 52. Id. at 304. 
 53. Id. at 305–06 (citing McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 54. Id. at 306. 
 55. Id. at 316–17. 
 56. Id. at 323–24. 
 57. Id. at 315. 
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services, Hyde “encourages alternate activity deemed in the public 
interest.”58 The Court further stated “[t]he financial constraints that restrict 
an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally 
protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental 
restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.”59 
Accordingly, it determined Congress must answer whether freedom of 
constitutionally protected choice warrants federal subsidization and held 
that Hyde does not impinge on the due process liberty recognized in Roe.60 
B.  An Intersectional Suspect Classification 
Poor and low-income women of color are represented 
disproportionately among Medicaid recipients;61 consequently, Hyde 
affects large numbers of women who live at the intersection of various 
lines of subordination, including race, gender, and class.62 Professor 
Kimberlé Crenshaw argues for judicial recognition of the way sex and race 
discrimination intersect to operate against black women in a unique way.63 
She points out that black women often experience double discrimination—
the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race 
and on the basis of sex.64 She further declares that courts and feminist and 
civil rights thinkers have treated black women “in ways that deny both the 
unique compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of their 
experiences to the larger classes of women and Blacks.”65 For example, 
someone can experience discrimination as a person of color, a woman, and 
a low-income individual simultaneously.66 Madeline Gomez similarly 
argues that since Roe, an over-zealous, under-inclusive focus on the “right 
to choose” within abortion litigation has helped to facilitate the 
development of legal doctrine that fails to consider the intersectional 
                                                     
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 316 (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 318. 
 61. Boonstra, supra note 18. 
 62. Jill E. Adams & Jessica Arons, A Travesty of Justice: Revisiting Harris v. McRae, 21 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 50–51 (2016). 
 63. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149–50 (1989), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1052&context=uclf [https://perma.cc/GLJ4-9556].  
 64. Id. at 149. 
 65. Id. at 150. 
 66. Hailey K. Flynn, Note, A Postal Code Lottery: Unequal Access to Abortion Services in the 
United States and Northern Ireland, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 629, 681 (2016). 
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subordination experienced by Latina immigrant women and other 
marginalized women, especially those of color.67 
Rather than recognizing that women of color are a suspect 
classification due to the intersectionality of their characteristics and 
subsequent experiences, “Supreme Court jurisprudence has insisted on 
evaluating the discriminatory purpose and effect of a statute based on a 
single identity or condition . . . .”68 The Court then “tends to apply an 
analysis commensurate with that which falls the lowest in its hierarchy of 
suspect classifications.”69 By doing so, the Court ignores violations of 
equal protection “that are based on a group’s multiple, intersecting 
characteristics.”70 In Maher, and again in Harris, the Court did exactly that 
by determining the failure to provide Medicaid funds for both 
nontherapeutic abortions and some medically necessary abortions did not 
discriminate against a suspect classification: 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come 
within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so 
recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of 
the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a 
different conclusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to 
an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to 
nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or 
services. But this Court has never held that financial need 
alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis.71 
In Maher and Harris, the Court ignored the race and sex of the 
population most impacted by the Hyde restrictions, characteristics that 
would trigger heightened scrutiny in equal protection analysis. Justice 
Marshall pointed out this lack of recognition in his dissenting opinion in 
Harris: 
The class burdened by the Hyde Amendment consists of 
indigent women, a substantial proportion of whom are 
members of minority races. As I observed in Maher, 
nonwhite women obtain abortions at nearly double the rate 
of whites . . . . In my view, the fact that the burden of the 
                                                     
 67. Madeline M. Gomez, Note, Intersections at the Border: Immigration Enforcement, 
Reproductive Oppression, and the Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 84, 112–13 (2015). 
 68. Adams & Arons, supra note 62, at 52 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1977) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). 
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Hyde Amendment falls exclusively on financially destitute 
women suggests a “special condition, which tends seriously 
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”72 
The Court should account for the intersectionality of factors like race, 
sex, and socioeconomic status when determining whether a law 
disproportionately impacts a certain minority group to the extent that strict 
scrutiny analysis is triggered. The implementation of the PPACA has 
worsened the effects of Hyde on women who experience discrimination 
on multiple fronts.73 A majority of state Medicaid programs fail to cover 
nontherapeutic abortions, and at least twenty-five states have barred all 
plans participating in the state’s marketplace from covering abortions.74 
However, “when a law disproportionately affects women of color—and 
poor women at that—the Court ignores the disparate racial impact of the 
law, ‘downgrades’ the standard of review applicable because it discounts 
the invidiousness of sex-based classifications, and then applies rational 
review based on their indigent status alone.”75 As a result, the abortion 
right—a negative right—is meaningless to women without the adequate 
resources to exercise it. 
Although the PPACA has worsened the impact of Hyde’s restrictions 
on low-income, minority women living in states that fail to provide 
Medicaid coverage for nontherapeutic abortions, the Act carries a silver 
lining: its potential reading as a declaration of positive rights. The 
PPACA’s seeming declaration of a positive health care right could call 
into question the Court’s argument in Harris that the right to an abortion 
is not a positive one.76 
C. The PPACA and Positive Rights 
The Hyde Amendment’s constitutionality rests upon an 
understanding of the right to an abortion as a negative right. The Court in 
Harris determined that the federal government’s failure to subsidize 
certain medically necessary abortions was not a violation of the due 
process liberty recognized in Roe because recognizing a privacy right to 
abortion does not confer an entitlement to the funds necessary to access 
                                                     
 72. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 343–44 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States 
v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
 73. See supra Part I. 
 74. See Boonstra, supra note 18; Abortion and the ACA, supra note 24. 
 75. Adams & Arons, supra note 62, at 53. 
 76. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 317. 
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one.77 It further reasoned that “[t]o translate the limitation on 
governmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative 
funding obligation would require Congress to subsidize the medically 
necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted 
a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services.”78 
Thus, the Court seemed to indicate that only a direct interference with a 
fundamental right would constitute an infringement.79 
The Court’s due process analysis in Harris is in line with our 
constitutional system’s treatment of rights as “individual, alienable, and 
negative.”80 Constitutional rights are usually understood to impose on 
government “only a duty to refrain from certain injurious actions, rather 
than an affirmative obligation to direct energy or resources to meet 
another’s needs.”81  
Negative rights “forbid the state from taking action of some kind”;82 
for example, Roe forbids any state interference with a woman’s choice to 
have an abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy.83 On the other 
hand, positive rights are generally defined as legally enforceable claims to 
food, shelter, health care, education, and sometimes employment.84 These 
rights are called “positive” “because they require the state to take 
initiatives” and, more importantly, “appropriate funds.”85 Recognition of 
positive health care rights would thus call into question the understanding 
of abortion as a negative right. 
A negative right to abortion is no right at all for low-income women 
without appropriate health insurance or other means to cover the cost. 
Women in this situation can only access this “right” if it is treated as 
positive—if the state takes the initiative to appropriate funds for its 
                                                     
 77. Id. at 316–18. 
 78. Id. at 318. 
 79. See Larry P. Boyd, The Hyde Amendment: New Implications for Equal Protection Claims, 
33 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 299 (1981). 
 80. Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative 
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care Act, the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes, and the 
Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639, 1687 (2012); 
see also Helen Hershkoff, Foreword, Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33 
RUTGERS L.J. 799, 809 (2002) (“Negative rights comprise defensive claims against invasion by the 
state; the citizen can assert a negative right against the government, which then may be barred from 
invading aspects of the individual’s liberty or property.”). 
 83. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).  
 84. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1686; see also Hershkoff, supra note 82, at 809 (“If negative rights 
provide a shield, positive rights extend a sword, entailing affirmative claims that can be used to compel 
the state to afford substantive goods or services as an aspect of constitutional duty.”). 
 85. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1686–87. 
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fulfillment. Professor Aditi Gowri critiques the dichotomy of negative and 
positive rights, arguing that prioritizing negative rights—or “leave me 
alone rights”—is “effectively to have decided that it is more important to 
expend public resources on increasing the range of choices available to 
those who already have more power, money, and knowledge than to 
increase opportunities for those who have less resources.”86 She argues 
that the dichotomy between both types of rights is politically suspect 
because granting only negative rights “augments the freedom of those with 
greater power, money, and other resources, while constraining those with 
less.”87 With regard to reproductive rights, she adds that “those constrained 
by a negative right will more often be women than men.”88 This concern 
has rung true in the realm of abortions rights; women with the appropriate 
means are able to choose whether or not to exercise their abortion right, 
while those lacking such means effectively have no choice. 
Although constitutional rights are commonly understood as negative, 
there are some exceptional rights within the Constitution that could be 
given an affirmative reading and bestow “at least contingent affirmative 
burdens on government—for example, the Fourteenth Amendment right 
that no state ‘deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.’”89 Additionally, “there is growing international recognition 
that respect for civil and political rights may require affirmative 
government action.”90 A number of nations have codified positive rights 
into their own constitutions, and these rights are also on display in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.91 Although the 
Court in 1989 explicitly declared it would not recognize positive rights,92 
Professor Edward Rubin critically points out that another institution also 
interprets the Constitution—the Legislature.93 
Professor Rubin suggests that if we want to know the current state of 
constitutional thinking about positive rights, we need to look to statutes as 
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well as decided cases: “[S]tatutes affect judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution because the statutes themselves are interpretations.”94 He 
argues that “statutory law is moving toward the implementation of positive 
rights . . . toward the idea that every American has a right to food, shelter, 
health care, and education”—and the PPACA is a “dramatic acceleration” 
of this trend.95 
According to Professor Rubin, the PPACA’s universality, 
uniformity, and strong normativity all point to its possession of the 
characteristics of a positive constitutional right to health care.96  Rather 
than applying only to a particular segment of the population, the Act 
applies to nearly everyone and appears to avoid the stigma of a welfare 
program.97 The Act is also uniform in putting wage earners and the poor 
in the same boat; instead of a program directed only at wage earners (like 
Social Security), or only the poor (like food stamps), the PPACA combines 
both groups and is perceived as minimizing the difference between them.98 
Lastly, the PPACA has been presented not merely as a social program but 
as a moral imperative.99 
Professor Rubin offers the right of free speech as an example of a 
constitutional right that shares the same three features of universality, 
uniformity, and normativity that the PPACA possesses: The right applies 
to everyone, operates for everyone in the same essential way, and is 
regarded as a moral imperative.100 As a result, he concludes the PPACA 
simultaneously challenges the courts to think about establishing positive 
rights as a matter of constitutional law and facilitates any effort by the 
courts to do so. “It encourages judges to reverse DeShaney and hold [that] 
the Due Process Clause guarantees minimal levels of safety and 
security.”101 
III. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ABORTION COVERAGE 
Even if the PPACA was interpreted as conferring a positive health 
care right on Americans, the Executive Order applying Hyde’s restrictions 
to the PPACA102 warrants further analysis in finding a positive right to 
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abortion through this interpretation. Although reclaiming the abortion 
right as a health care right instead of a “choice” “has the potential to offer 
greater protection for access to abortion-related healthcare[,]”103 applying 
the PPACA’s recognition of positive constitutional rights to the Court’s 
due process analysis in Harris is another way to accomplish this result. 
Any reversal of the principle in DeShaney, where the Court explicitly 
held the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on 
a state,104 would call into question the Court’s due process analysis 
regarding the federal government’s obligations in Harris. Professor Rubin 
indicated a positive-rights reading of the PPACA could encourage judges 
to reverse DeShaney,105 and the Court’s due process analysis in Harris 
rests upon his finding that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
imposes no affirmative obligation on the government.106 The Court in 
Harris affirmed that the liberty protected by the Clause affords protection 
against unwarranted government interference.107 A transition toward 
understanding our constitutional rights as positive would thus expand the 
federal government’s role. Contrary to the Court’s reasoning, a woman’s 
freedom of choice would “carr[y] with it a constitutional entitlement to the 
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices”108 
under this new understanding of the liberty protected under the Clause. 
Rather than blaming a woman’s indigency for her inability to enjoy the 
full range of her constitutionally protected freedom of choice,109 a positive 
understanding of our rights would require the federal government to 
remove the restrictions placed on her by the Hyde Amendment. 
Accordingly, the government, not the woman, would bear the 
responsibility for her inability to enjoy the full range of her freedom of 
choice. 
The PPACA’s seeming grant of a positive health care right is a 
vehicle for finding Hyde unconstitutional. Although the recognition of 
positive constitutional rights would represent a major and highly 
controversial development for American constitutional law,110 and the 
current makeup of the Court “seems to prefer retrenchments and 
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clarifications to major innovations,”111 the PPACA presents a unique 
challenge to the Court to consider positive rights as a part of constitutional 
law.112 A movement toward positive rights, with the PPACA as the 
vehicle, would present an opportunity for the Court to not only reconsider 
its DeShaney holding113 but also revisit its due process analysis in cases 
like Harris. Reversing the DeShaney holding and revisiting Harris would 
force the Court to grapple with its affirmation that freedom of choice does 
not carry a constitutional entitlement to the resources necessary to exercise 
that freedom,114 thus opening the door to finding Hyde unconstitutional. 
IV. THE FATE OF HYDE AND THE PPACA UNDER THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION 
The search for a right to abortion coverage—a right that is 
meaningful for low-income, minority women that lack adequate health 
insurance or other means to cover the cost—appears fruitless under the 
current administration. President Trump has suggested he will preserve 
Planned Parenthood’s federal funding only if the organization 
discontinues providing abortion services;115 has signed a bill rolling back 
an Obama administration rule barring states from denying family planning 
grants to Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers;116 has vowed 
to nominate anti-choice justices to the Supreme Court;117 and nominated 
Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court, who “voted with a majority of the 
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[Tenth Circuit] in favor of privately held for-profit secular 
corporations . . . who raised religious objections to paying for 
contraception for women covered under their health care plans.”118 
Additionally, on January 24, 2017, the House passed the No Taxpayer 
Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full Disclosure Act.119 If the 
Act passes the Senate, the Hyde Amendment, which has always functioned 
as a budget rider attached to individual federal appropriations bills, would 
become a permanent rule.120 Thus, the Internal Revenue Code and the 
PPACA would be amended to prohibit qualified health plans from 
including coverage for abortions.121 This potential codification of Hyde 
and complete bar of abortion coverage in health plans under the PPACA 
would render the negative abortion right even more inaccessible for low-
income women. 
While the Trump Administration and Congress’s anti-choice stance 
does not bode well for low-income women seeking meaningful access to 
abortion—and the confirmation of Justice Gorsuch yields no shift in a 
Court already unlikely to recognize positive rights—the PPACA will 
likely remain in place. In July 2017, the Senate rejected a Republican plan 
to repeal the PPACA requirements that most people have health coverage 
and that large employers offer coverage to their workers.122 According to 
the CBO, the plan would have increased the number of uninsured people 
to 15 million by next year, and would have increased premiums by around 
twenty percent for people buying insurance on their own.123 More recently, 
Majority Leader McConnell called off a vote on a PPACA-repeal bill after 
Senate Republicans could not garner the votes to meet the fifty-one-vote 
threshold required for passage.124 The bill was a last-ditch effort to repeal 
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the PPACA before the budget rules expired and sixty votes are required to 
overcome a Democrat (or Republican) filibuster of a bill.125 
Despite the Trump administration’s demonstrated hostility toward 
abortion rights and the PPACA, Congress’s failure to repeal it allows for 
a potential positive rights understanding of the Act to persist. The 
possibility does exist that the Trump administration may stop defending 
the PPACA’s cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) in court,126 which “would 
cause health insurers to hike premiums or leave the Obamacare market 
altogether.”127 The federal government pays CSRs to health insurers to 
lower cost sharing (i.e., deductibles and copays) for the poorest 
Obamacare enrollees, paying out $7 billion through this program last 
year.128 House Republicans filed a lawsuit in July 2014, arguing that 
because Congress did not actually appropriate the money for these funds, 
the administration should not continue making these payments.129 A 
federal judge agreed with the House members and ordered a halt to the 
payments, but suspended the order to allow the government to appeal.130 
The case is currently pending before the Federal Circuit.131 While the 
Trump administration has not committed to paying the PPACA’s CSRs in 
2018, it has been paying the subsidies on a month-to-month basis since 
President Trump assumed office.132 
Lastly, barring any major shifts on the bench during the 
administration’s tenure, abortion jurisprudence is unlikely to change. As a 
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result, repealing Hyde still remains the next hurdle in achieving a right to 
abortion for all women, not just those with the means to access that right. 
The PPACA’s likely permanence under the Trump administration thus 
allows for a positive-rights understanding of the Act to persist. 
CONCLUSION 
Hyde’s 1976 passage severely curtailed the abortion right, 
preventing a woman who receives Medicaid benefits from using those 
benefits to pay for an abortion. Hyde’s burden, which functionally denies 
the abortion right to Medicaid recipients who cannot pay out-of-pocket for 
the procedure, disproportionately falls on poor and low-income women of 
color, who are most likely to receive Medicaid benefits.133 The PPACA’s 
2010 passage worsened Hyde’s impact on these women, strengthening the 
equal protection arguments against Hyde’s constitutional validity; the Act 
continues to disproportionately impact a group based on the 
intersectionality of sex, race, and socioeconomic status.134 
While the Act’s effects have strengthened the argument for the 
recognition of an intersectional suspect classification,135 the PPACA’s 
features also seemingly confer a positive health care right on the American 
people.136 In doing so, the Act opens the door to finding other kinds of 
positive rights—rights that require the government to take the initiative to 
appropriate funds for their fulfillment.137 Further research on the 
constitutionality of Hyde should explore potential means for recognizing 
both an intersectional suspect classification and positive rights. While the 
Court’s eventual recognition of an intersectional suspect classification 
may be more likely than its recognition of positive constitutional rights, 
more scholarship on using the PPACA to recognize positive rights could 
eventually pave the way for an abortion right that is meaningful and 
protected for all women.  The PPACA creates an avenue for the Court to 
find a positive abortion right that not only protects a woman from state 
interference in exercising her right but also ensures she has the resources 
necessary to access this due process liberty. 
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